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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS-DEFENDANT
MAY HAVE INACCURATE STATEMENTS EXCISED FROM AFFIDAVIT UN-
LESS AFFIANT PROVES REASONABLE BELIEF IN TRUTH OF SUCH IN-
FORMATION-PROBABLE CAUSE TESTED FROM REMAINING TRUTHFUL
INFORMATION-Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d
234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
Michael Paul Theodor was arrested after entering a house which
police had been searching pursuant to a search warrant. Keys found in
his possession were used to unlock a room believed to contain contra-
band, and large quantities of marijuana and LSD were in fact found. He
was charged with possession and possession for sale of marijuana and
restricted dangerous drugs in violation of the California Health and
Safety Code.: At a combined preliminary hearing and hearing to
suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 (f),2 Theodor sought
to challenge the veracity of the affidavits given in support of the search
warrant by a police officer and an undisclosed informant who had been
arrested for possession of narcotics allegedly purchased from Theodor.'
He also sought to discover the identity of the informant and to quash
the warrant on the ground that the issuing magistrate had improperly
relied on unreported oral testimony. The motions to quash and to com-
pel disclosure were denied. The magistrate also refused to allow
Theodor to question witnesses for the purpose of controverting facts
stated in the affidavits. Theodor was held to answer in the superior
court where his motions to suppress under Penal Code sections 995 and
1538.5(i) 4 were again denied. The California Supreme Court took
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 11530, 11530.5, 11910-11 (West Supp.
1971), repealed, ch. 1407, §§ 2, 4, [1972] Cal. Stat. -.
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5(f) (West 1972). Section 1538.5 entitles a defendant
to a pre-trial hearing for the purpose of moving to suppress evidence and for presenting
evidence in support of the motion. Under subdivision (f), the motion may be made
and evidence presented at the preliminary hearing in the case of a felony offense ini-
tiated by complaint.
3. The informant had been arrested by a federal marshall at Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport with two and a half bricks of marijuana and a quantity of LSD
in his possession. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 83, 501 P.2d 234, 238,
104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 230 (1972).
4. CAL. PEN. CODn § 995 (West 1972) provides, inter alia, that the information
must be set aside if the defendant has been committed without probable cause.
Section 1538.5(i) entitles a defendant held to answer for a felony in superior court
to a hearing de novo on his motion to suppress.
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the case on Theodor's petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition
under sections 1538.5(i) and 999a.5
In granting the writ of prohibition, the supreme court addressed
itself to three issues raised by the petitioner: (1) whether the issuing
magistrate's partial reliance on unrecorded oral testimony violated
Penal Code section 1526(b),' (2) whether petitioner was entitled to
disclosure of the informant's identity and (3) whether petitioner should
have been permitted to call witnesses for the purpose of controverting
facts stated in the affidavits. The court held that the magistrate had
properly relied on written affidavits under section 1526(a)7 and that
oral testimony taken in addition thereto was superflous and thus not
subject to the requirements of subdivision 1526(b), which provides
for oral testimony taken in lieu of written affidavits.8 The court found
that petitioner was entitled to disclosure of the identity of the informant
since the latter was a potential material witness on the issue of petitioner's
guilt or innocence. Although the court reserved judgment as to wheth-
er Theodor, on the facts shown, was entitled to a hearing into the
veracity of the affidavits,' 0 it did reaffirm the right of a defendant in
California to go behind the face of the affidavit, and enunciated for the
first time the standard of accuracy to which the affidavit would be held."
In ordering disclosure of the identity of the informant, the court
reiterated that disclosure is required when the defendant has shown
that the informer may be a material witness on the issue of guilt or
5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 999a (West 1972) provides for interlocutory review of the
denial of the section 995 motion to set aside the information for lack of probable
cause.
Section 1538.5(i) allows interlocutory supreme court review by petition for writ
of mandate or prohibition after the motion to suppress has been denied.
6. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1526(b) (West 1972) provides:
In lieu of the written affidavit required in subdivision (a), the magistrate may
take an oral statement under oath which shall be recorded and transcribed. The
transcribed statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for the purpose of this
chapter. In such cases, the recording of the sworn oral statement and the tran-
scribed statement shall be certified by the magistrate receiving it and shall be
filed with the clerk of the court. (Emphasis added).
7. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1526(a) (West 1972) provides:
The magistrate may, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the person
seeking the warrant and any witnesses he may produce, and must take his affi-
davit or their affidavits in writing, and cause same to be subscribed by the party
or parties making same.
8. 8 Cal. 3d at 86-87, 501 P.2d at 240-41, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 231-33; see note 6
supra.
9. 8 Cal. 3d at 88-90, 501 P.2d at 241-43, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 233-35, citing, e.g.,
Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 836, 842, 463 P.2d 721, 724-25, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369,
372-73 (1970).
10. 8 Cal. 3d at 103-04, 501 P.2d at 252-53, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45.
11. Id. at 95-101, 501 P.2d at 247-51, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 239-43.
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innocence, but not when the defendant's object is merely to attack the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant."2 The
court found that petitioner had met his burden of showing "'a reason-
able possibility that the anonymous informant .. . could give evidence
on the issue of guilt which might result in [petitioner's] exoneration.' "13
Once that burden has been met, the prosecution must disclose the
identity of the informant or incur a dismissal of the case. 4
The court also considered petitioner's claim that he was entitled to
disclosure of the informant's identity for the purpose of questioning the
validity of the informant's arrest. It acknowledged that a defendant
has the right under People v. Martin' to attack the validity of the
search or arrest of another where relevant.' 6 Since the court required
disclosure of the identity of the informant as a potential material wit-
ness, however, it declined to decide whether the vicarious exclusionary
rule would provide another ground for disclosure.' 7 Nonetheless, the
court left little doubt as to what its answer to that question will be,
stating:
It is obvious that the policy of deterring unlawful police conduct can-
not be effectuated by means of the vicarious exclusionary rule if the de-
fendant is barred from learning the identity of the witness who was il-
legally arrested or searched.' 8
Ostensibly, this sweeping dictum could foreshadow the granting of an
absolute right to disclosure whenever an arrestee is used as an in-
formant.' 9
12. Id. at 88, 501 P.2d at 241, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 233, citing People v. Keener, 55
Cal. 2d 714, 723, 361 P.2d 587, 592, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859, 864 (1961).
13. 8 Cal. 3d at 88-90, 501 P.2d at 241-43, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 233-35, quoting People
v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 840, 434 P.2d 366, 372, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (1967).
14. 8 Cal. 3d at 88, 501 P.2d at 241, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (citations omitted). In
the recent case of People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 779-81, 505 P.2d 537, 542-46, 106
Cal. Rptr. 113, 119-21 (1973), the court extended the material witness rule to require
that the police obtain from any informant who may be a material witness sufficient iden-
tification so as to facilitate his location by the defense after disclosure. That require-
ment had previously been imposed with respect to regular or paid informants in
Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 851-53 & n.10, 464 P.2d 42, 45-46 & n.10,
83 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589-90 & n.10 (1970).
15. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
16. 8 Cal. 3d at 104, 501 P.2d at 254, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 246, citing People v.
Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
17. 8 Cal. 3d at 104-05, 501 P.2d at 254, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
18. Id. at 104, 501 P.2d at 254, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
19. In addition to the material witness rule and the vicarious exclusionary rule, an
additional basis for disclosure meriting exploration is the defendant's right to attack
the accuracy of the affidavit. If Theodor were not entitled to disclosure on any other
ground, would he not be entitled to call the informant as a witness in his effort to
439
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Theodor eliminates any doubt as to a defendant's right in California
to attack the veracity of an affidavit given in support of a search war-
rant.2" That right has been the subject of recent controversy.2 1 Its
advocacy is usually grounded on the Fourth Amendment prerequisite,
established in Aguilar v. Texas,22 of a neutral and objective magistrate
for the warrant issuing process. False facts, it is argued, prevent the
magistrate from fulfilling his neutral and objective function, and should
therefore be disregarded in testing for probable cause as are conclusional
allegations under Aguilar.23  The United States Supreme Court has not
yet resolved this issue. In Rugendorf v. United States,24 the Court specif-
ically left the question open but was willing to assume arguendo that the
challenge could be made. The federal courts are divided on the issue. 2'5
prove the inaccuracy? See Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affi-
davit: What If It's False?, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 96, 136-38 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as U.C.L.A. Comment]. But cf. the rule stated in the text accompanying note 12
supra, to the effect that disclosure is not required when the defendant is merely ques-
tioning the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
A concomitant right to disclosure of the informant's identity in order to attack the
veracity of the affidavit would be conditional upon defendant's meeting his threshold
burden for a hearing under section 1538.5 to contest such veracity. See text accom-
panying notes 47 & 48 infra. The right to disclosure based on the vicarious exclu-
sionary rule, by contrast, could not logically require any initial showing except that
the informant was an arrestee.
20. 8 Cal. 3d at 94-95, 501 P.2d at 246-47, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39.
21. See U.C.L.A. Comment, supra note 19, at 103-11; Kipperman, Inaccurate Search
Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REV. 825
(1971); Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits for Search Warrants: Pierc-
ing the Presumption of Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9 (1970); Note, Testing the Factual
Basis for a Search Warrant, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1529 (1967).
22. 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
23. 8 Cal. 3d at 90-91 n.6, 501 P.2d at 243-44 n.6, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 235 n.6, citing
U.C.L.A. Comment, supra note 19, at 108.
24. 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964).
25. See United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967) (allowing chal-
lenge); United States v. Gianaris, 25 F.R.D. 194, 195 (D.D.C. 1960) (challenge re-
fused). FED. R. CIuM. P. 41(e) provides in part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the prop-
erty and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that:
(1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insuf-
ficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described on its face,
or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on
which the warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed ....
(Emphasis added).
A few of the federal cases allowing the challenge invoke Rule 41(e) specifically.
United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459, 463 n.4 (2d Cir. 1966); King v. United
States, 282 F.2d 398, 400 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1960). It is unclear whether these cases
rely upon subdivision (4) or are treating affidavit inaccuracy as a sixth and separate
ground under the rule. See 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE § 673,
at 106 (1969). Proposed amendments to Rules 41 and 12(b)(3) would combine all
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Only a minority of states allow the challenge.2 6
In reaching its decision to permit the challenge, the court in Theodor
did not rely on the aforementioned constitutional grounds. Rather, it
held that Penal Code sections 1539 and 154027 furnished statutory au-
thority for attacking the factual basis of the affidavit.28 Those statutes
provide, respectively, for challenging the "grounds on which the warrant
was issued"' 29 and for the return of property seized upon erroneous
grounds.30 They had been interpreted to include affidavit accuracy
among the challengeable grounds for the issuance of the warrant and to
authorize suppression as well as the return of the seized property.81
But section 1538.5,32 adopted in 1967, provides specifically for suppres-
sion and enumerates specific grounds therefor, among which affidavit
inaccuracy is not to be found.3  The question thus arose as to whether
grounds for suppression into one: "that the evidence was illegally obtained." 48
F.R.D. 553, 579, 627-28 (1970).
26. U.C.L.A. Comment, supra note 19, at 106 & n.40.
27. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1539-40 (West 1972).
28. 8 Cal. 3d at 90-95, 501 P.2d at 243-47, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 235-39.
29. Prior to its amendment at the time section 1538.5 was adopted, section 1539
read:
If the grounds on which the warrant was issued be controverted, [the magistrate]
must proceed to take testimony in relation thereto, and the testimony of each
witness must be reduced to writing and authenticated in the manner prescribed
in section eight hundred and sixty nine. CAL. PEN. CODE- § 1539 (West 1967)
(emphasis added).
Section 1539 (a) now reads in relevant part:
If a special hearing be held in the superior court pursuant to Section 1538.5,
or if the grounds on which the warrant was issued be controverted and a motion
to return property be made (i) by a defendant on grounds not covered by Section
1538.5; ... the judge or magistrate must proceed to take testimony in relation
thereto, and the testimony of each witness must be reduced to writing and authenti-
cated by a shorthand reporter in the manner prescribed in Section 869. CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1539 (West 1972) (emphasis added).
30. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1540 (West 1972) provides:
If it appears that the property taken is not the same as that described in the
warrant, or that there is no probable cause for believing the existence of the
grounds on which the warrant was issued, the magistrate must cause it to be re-
stored to the person from whom it was taken. (Emphasis added).
31. 8 Cal. 3d at 92-93, 501 P.2d at 245, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 237 (citations omitted).
32. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (West 1972).
33. Section 1538.5 provides in relevant part:
(a) Grounds. A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress
as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or
seizure on either of the following grounds:
(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because (i) the
warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained is not
that described in the warrant; (iii) there was not probable cause for the issuance
of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of the warrant violated federal or
state constitutional standards; or (v) there was any other violation of federal or
state constitutional standards. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5(a) (West 1972).
The Theodor court could have held that factual inaccuracy in the affidavit would suf-
ficiently undermine the probable cause analysis so as to bring it within the purview of
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the adoption of section 1538.5 indicated legislative intent to limit the
application of sections 1539 and 1540 to motions for the return of
property and to eliminate affidavit inaccuracy as a ground for sup-
pression. The court invoked the presumption that the legislature does
not intend to overthrow established principles of law, absent a clear
expression of intent to the contrary,34 and cited a legislative committee
report issued just prior to the adoption of section 1538.5 to support its
conclusion that that section was merely intended to affect the timing of
search and seizure motions and not to pre-empt the role previously
played by sections 1539 and 1540.31
The court then turned for the first time to the question of the standard
of accuracy to which affidavits in support of a search warrant should
be held."6 It adopted the same standard of reasonableness that is ap-
plied to the broader question of probable cause. That is, the affiant
must have been reasonable in his belief that the facts stated in the
affidavit were accurate. 7  The court drew support for such a standard
from the fact that reasonableness is the test in the warrantless search or
arrest situation, wherein a police officer must make the same factual
judgments as would be reflected in an affidavit.
3 8
In choosing a standard based on reasonableness, the court compro-
mised between two more extreme and opposite alternatives: the first
would require absolute material accuracy, 9 while the second would
allow even unreasonable inaccuracy to stand absent a showing of bad
faith.4° The court reasoned that a standard based on good faith alone
section 1538.5(a) subdivision (2)(iii) (cf. FuD. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(4) discussed in
note 25 supra) or that accuracy was constitutionally required under subdivision (2) (v)
(see text accompanying notes 22 & 23 supra).
34. 8 Cal. 3d at 92, 501 P.2d at 245, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 237, quoting County of Los
Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634, 644, 122 P.2d 526, 532 (1942).
35. 8 Cal. 3d at 94, 501 P.2d at 246, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
36. Prior cases had dealt with procedural aspects of the motion under sections 1539
and 1540 and not with the standard of accuracy required under those sections. See,
e.g., People v. Butler, 64 Cal. 2d 842, 843-46, 415 P.2d 819, 820-22, 52 Cal. Rptr. 4,
5-7 (1966); People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d 714, 719-20, 361 P.2d 587, 589-90, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 859, 861-62 (1961), disapproved on other grounds in Butler.
37. 8 Cal. 3d at 100-01, 501 P.2d at 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
38. Id. at 99-100, 501 P.2d at 250-51, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 242-43, citing Hill v. Cali-
fornia, 401 U.S. 797 (1971), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952, 954 (N.D.N.Y. 1929). The re-
quirement of absolute accuracy is advocated in U.C.L.A Comment, supra note 19, at
139-47.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Bridges, 419 F.2d 963, 966-67 (8th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908
(1966); People v. Alfinito, 211 N.E.2d 644, 646 (N.Y. 1965).
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would fail to deter police carelessness, 41 but concluded that exclusionary
rules are not applicable so long as police conduct has been reasonable.
42
Under the Theodor standard, the burden shifts to the prosecution to
show reasonable error once the defendant has proven a factual in-
accuracy.43 Absent such a showing of reasonableness, Theodor requires
that the inaccurate facts be excised from the affidavit and probable
cause tested from the remaining information. 44  Thus, only erroneous
facts which are indispensable to a finding of probable cause can ulti-
mately vitiate the warrant. 45  The court specifically holds out the
possibility, however, that the knowing use of intentional misstatements
may vitiate the warrant, whether or not the excisement of the misin-
formation from the affidavit would defeat the finding of probable
cause.
46
As for a defendant's right to inquire into the accuracy of the affidavit
by means of a hearing under section 1538.5, the court sets up an im-
portant condition precedent. The defendant has the threshold burden
of showing "with some specificity, [his] reasons for contending that
the affidavit is inaccurate. ' 47 The mere allegation of inaccuracy will
not entitle him to call witnesses in the hope of discovering an error.48
Just what will entitle a defendant to a hearing into the accuracy of
the affidavit is the crucial unanswered question. Petitioner Theodor
pointed to discrepancies between his physical appearance and that of the
alleged seller described in the affidavit to show that the informant could
not have had him in mind.49 He alleged, further, that coercion at the
time of the informant's arrest had resulted in an erroneous if not ficti-
tious account of the alleged drug purchase.50 The mere fact that
Theodor did not match the description of the seller in the affidavit
would not impugn the description's accuracy if, in fact, the informant
was describing someone else. Given a showing of coercion, the inference
might arise that the informant was not describing any real person at all.
But to base such an inference on the mere allegation of coercion would
41. 8 Cal. 3d at 98, 501 P.2d at 249, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 241, citing United States v.
Freeman, 358 F.2d 459, 463 n.4 (2d Cir. 1966).
42. 8 Cal. 3d at 97, 501 P.2d at 248-49, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41.
43. Id. at 101-02, 501 P.2d at 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44.
44. Id. at 100-01, 501 P.2d at 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
45. Id. at 101 n.14, 501 P.2d at 251 n.14, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243 n.14.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 103, 501 P.2d at 252, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
48. Id., citing United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
49. 8 Cal. 3d at 103, 501 P.2d at 253, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
50. Id. at 103, 501 P.2d at 252-53, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
1973]
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be to invest that allegation with a potency which the court specifically
denied to the naked allegation of inaccuracy itself;51 the naked allega-
tion of coercion would entitle the defendant to a hearing, at least when-
ever the affidavit contained the description of an unaccounted for sus-
pect. The court declined to address itself fully to this issue on the theory
that the required disclosure of the informant's identity might obviate
the problem.52
The court suggested, additionally, that a showing of coercion would
increase the burden on the prosecution to show that the police were
reasonable in relying on any misinformation received from the infor-
mant.53  The very presence of coercion, however, could often obviate
the need to show any specific inaccuracy in the description or elsewhere,
since, as the court noted earlier in its opinion, "an affidavit may be
inaccurate because of the failure to include information which might
otherwise negate a finding of probable cause." 4  The presence of
coercion might negate the finding required under Aguilar that the infor-
mant is reliable. 55 Thus proof of coercion could constitute a prima
facie showing of inaccuracy and of unreasonableness. Furthermore, if
omission of the fact of coercion is itself an inaccuracy, a specific offer of
reasons for contending the informant was coerced should satisfy
Theodor's threshold burden, independent of any inference of an errone-
ous description.
One other issue is left unresolved by the court in Theodor. If an
alleged erroneous fact is such that its excisement from the affidavit
would clearly not defeat the finding of probable cause, will the de-
fendant nonetheless be entitled, upon offer of proof of the existence
of the erroneous fact, to a hearing into the accuracy of the affidavit
as a whole?56  In its original opinion, the court had assigned to the
51. The court stressed the requirement that the defendant offer specific reasons for
contending that the affidavit is inaccurate. Id. at 103, 501 P.2d at 252, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 243.
52. Id. at 103-04, 501 P.2d at 253, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 245. Presumedly, if Theodor,
after disclosure, can offer specific reasons for contending that the informant was
coerced, this will be sufficient to raise the inference of inaccuracy and satisfy the
threshold burden. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
53. 8 Cal. 3d at 103, 501 P.2d at 253, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
54. Id. at 96 n.11, 501 P.2d at 247 n.11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 239 n.11.
55. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
56. Nowhere in its opinion does the court indicate that the scope of the section
1538.5 hearing is to be limited to the proof of the specific inaccuracy charged. Were
the inquiry to be so limited, there would then be no purpose for a hearing which
could not foreseeably benefit the defendant, viz., where the alleged inaccuracy is
immaterial to the finding of probable cause.
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defendant the burden of showing a material error and, thus, the threshold
burden of offering specific reasons for believing that the affidavit might
be materially inaccurate.17  In a subsequent modification, the court
deleted all references to materiality.58 This would appear to expose the
entire affidavit to scrutiny at a section 1538.5 hearing upon defendant's
offer to prove even the most minute and immaterial factual error.
Nevertheless, the adoption of a standard for affidavit accuracy based
on "reasonable belief' will endanger only the most carelessly or deceit-
fully procured search warrants. By limiting a defendant's right to a
hearing into affidavit accuracy, moreover, the court necessarily precludes
the testing of every affidavit. Ultimately, it is the scope of the threshold
burden, as much as the standard of accuracy itself, which will reveal
the vulnerability of inaccurate search warrant affidavits in California.
Elliot C. Talenfeld
57. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Adv. Cal. 3d 77 (1972); L.A. DAmLy J. APP. REP.,
Oct. 16, 1972, at 16.
58. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Adv. Cal. 3d 348a (1972). Compare the sources
cited in note 57 supra with Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104
Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
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